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RANDY BARNETT’S CRITIQUE OF
DEMOCRACY (AND JOHN MARSHALL?)
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.1 New York: HarperCollins
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth).
Sanford Levinson2
INTRODUCTION: AN UNFORTUNATE TITLE
There is much that is interesting and worth discussing in
Randy Barnett’s new book, Our Republican Constitution:
Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People.3 However,
the title of his book, especially for academic readers, greatly
disserves the argument he is making and unnecessarily provokes
peripheral objections, perhaps including this one. As a matter of
fact, Barnett’s book is a worthy complement to Richard Epstein’s
2014 magnum opus, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The
Uncertain Quest for Limited Government.4 Whatever one thinks
of Epstein’s substantive ideas—and I assume they are largely
congruent with Barnett’s own—there is no doubt that Epstein
gives the reader an absolutely accurate guide as to where he is
coming from and where he is going. Where he is coming from,

1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center
for the Constitution.
2. W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
An earlier version of this essay was prepared for an excellent conference on The
Republican Constitution, co-organized by Larry Solum and Kurt Lash and held at the
University of Illinois on March 18, 2016. I am very grateful for the hospitality and
intellectual stimulation received on that occasion, at least some of which is reflected in the
differences between that version and these published comments. I also appreciate the
incisive suggestions offered by Jill Hasday.
3. RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).
4. RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014).
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briefly, is what he accurately defined as the central liberal
tradition associated with such philosophers as “Hobbes, Locke,
Hume, Madison, and Montesquieu” (p. xi). One might also
include, of course, such later philosophers as John Stuart Mill,
whose principal book is titled, after all, On Liberty, and the late
Robert Nozick, whose Anarchy, State, and Utopia offers what I
assume Barnett finds a sympathetic account of the minimalist
state that even libertarians should accept. Epstein was obviously
writing for a sophisticated academic audience, which presumably
would be aware of the difference between “classical liberalism”
and the “liberalism” linked to the contemporary Democratic
Party. Barnett, on the other hand, is publishing what is very much
a trade book designed for a wider audience, and perhaps he
believed that too many potential readers would be scared off or
otherwise alienated by the very idea that they were being asked
to agree with anything meriting the label “liberal.” To the extent
this is true, it is an unfortunate commentary on the assumptions
about the political illiteracy of contemporary Americans. In any
event, it might help to explain why Barnett prefers the confusing
term “Republican Constitution.”
To be sure, Barnett (like Epstein before him) notes that
members of the founding generation were more than a bit
skeptical about democracy and frequently used the term
“republican” as the alternative to that view. To put it mildly, that
term is highly problematic with regard to providing any specific
definition. “There is not,” former President John Adams wrote in
1807, “a more unintelligible word in the English language than
republicanism.”5 That being said, it is hard to escape the
widespread use of the term both in American discourse and, just
as importantly, the analyses of American historians especially
over the past half-century.6 In his magisterial overview of the
latter, Daniel Rodgers, focusing on the use of the term
particularly by legal academics such as Frank Michelman, Cass
Sunstein, and Morton Horwitz, summarized its importance as
follows:
“[R]epublicanism” was swept up as shorthand for everything
liberalism was not: commitment to an active civic life (contra
liberalism’s obsession with immunities and rights), to explicit
5. Quoted in Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM.
HIST. 11, 38 (1992).
6. See generally id.
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value commitments and deliberative justice (as opposed to
liberalism’s procedural neutrality), to public, common
purposes (contras liberalism’s inability to imagine politics as
anything other than interest group pluralism).7

It is not surprising, then, that Epstein noted that the framers
he (and Barnett) choose to focus on “did not embrace the now
fashionable ‘republicanism’ that allows the government to
demand personal sacrifice or even individual valor in the service
of some higher, overriding vision of community good.”8 And, it is
important to emphasize, “community good” in this context means
more than extraction of taxes to pay for what economists refer to
as “public goods,” i.e., goods like national defense, dams to
protect against the flooding of rivers, and the like. They require
public funding precisely because their benefits cannot be limited
only to those who are willing to pay for them through a market.
All of us can “free ride” on the general protection provided by
missiles and submarines or the specific protection against floods
or other natural disasters. Thus, only coercive taxation will
provide the funds necessary to procure the general benefits, and
it is completely legitimate to make persons pay for goods that they
clearly and unequivocally benefit from.
This is very different, obviously, from providing public
funding for goods that can reasonably be sold through a market
and limited only to those who can afford to pay for them (such as
medical care, housing, food, or education, for starters). Defense
of the latter, including the inevitable redistribution involved in
taxing the haves to pay for benefits that will flow to the have-nots,
requires moving beyond “classical liberalism.” After all, a classic
trope in American thought condemns as a paradigm case of
injustice “tak[ing] property from A, and giv[ing] it to B.”9
Antagonism to such redistribution is at the heart of Epstein’s
classic book Takings.10 “Property” in this context applies to far
more than real estate; libertarians view much taxation as the
equivalent of theft inasmuch as it is taken by the state from
(have?) A’s to give to have-not (or, at least, politically wellsituated) B’s.

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 25.
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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It is not clear how much Barnett’s “Republican Constitution”
is truly receptive to such redistribution. None of the cases he
applauds involves B’s receipt of funds from A. This may, however,
simply reflect the fact that the Randy Barnett who is the leading
academic voice for a systematically libertarian perspective—as
revealed in his earlier distinguished writings11—has written a
considerably different book, in both tone and substance, for more
general readers. So be it, though I suspect that other academic
readers like myself will rue his decision. In any event, any reader
who expects any discussion of the “republican” basis of the
Constitution (as distinguished from a more “liberal” one) will be
disappointed.
Perhaps similar market considerations counseled against
simply titling the book The Anti-Democratic Constitution,
although that, too, would be accurate. He pays me the tribute of
noting my own book Our Undemocratic Constitution,12 which
argues that our Constitution, even as amended after 1787, does
not survive serious analysis under twenty-first century
understandings of democratic political theory. Moreover, both of
us agree that those who framed the document in 1787 scarcely
described themselves as sympathetic to “democracy.” Elbridge
Gerry undoubtedly spoke for many of his fellow delegates in
Philadelphia when he proclaimed that “[t]he evils we experience
flow from the excess of democracy,” as did Virginia Governor
Edmund Randolph when he similarly traced “the evils under
which the U.S. laboured” to their origins “in the turbulence and
follies of democracy” (p. 57). If that is the diagnosis of our
political illness, then one surely would not expect “democracy” as
such to be adopted as the treatment. And, of course, it was not.
What I regard as a bug, though, Barnett accepts as an attractive
feature.
Barnett is thus similar to the many critics of my own book
who reminded me, as they almost certainly unintentionally
quoted the slogan of the John Birch Society, that the Framers
adopted a “republic and not a democracy, and we should keep it
that way.” In this context, a “republican” government is not
11. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2d ed. 2015); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF
LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2d ed. 2014).
12. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2008).
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meant to contrast with “liberal,” as was the case with the
historians whose work was assessed by Daniel Rodgers, but,
instead, to contrast with “democratic.” Barnett does not seem to
disagree with my descriptive analysis. Indeed, he adopts with
characteristic exuberance a consistently anti-democratic posture,
expressing general contempt for the idea of collective consent of
the governed even as he privileges what he calls the sovereignty
of each and every individual, about which more anon.
Whatever title he wishes to give it, his argument is certainly
an important one, which should be grappled with, though it is
important to be clear about what embracing “democracy” entails.
If, for example, “democracy” is identified with support of
unfettered majority rule, there are in fact few devotees. Perhaps
Jeremy Waldron fills that niche, but, for better or worse, he has
few allies in his insistent attacks on judicial review and the
protection of vested rights (and, even more, creation of new
rights) ostensibly linked to such review. For better or worse, most
contemporary “democrats” are “liberal democrats” of one kind
or another who, as do Barnett and Ronald Dworkin, “take rights
seriously” even as they also generally support governance by the
majoritarian “consent of the governed.” To put it mildly, these
dual commitments may sometimes be in tension with one another,
but that simply underscores the complexity of intellectual life. As
Waldron notes in his recent collection of essays, classical
republican thought does not emphasize the necessity that rulers
be directly accountable to the community in any systematic way,
though, on the other hand, they should be motivated by a concern
for the general communal welfare.13 Modern liberal
constitutionalism, on the other hand, places much more reliance
on elections as mechanisms for disciplining “representative”
agents and providing the basis for legislation that reflects the
preferences of majorities, even if there are constitutional limits on
the extent to which those preferences should always be honored.
Since the title cannot possibly be justified in terms of its
fidelity to the explicitly “republican” tradition of Western, or even
Anglo-American political thought, save for the sound-bite
references to framers who indeed used the word “republican” to

13. See Jeremy Waldron, Accountability and Insolence, in POLITICAL POLITICAL
THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 176–77 (2016).
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distinguish themselves from “democrats,”14 one is tempted to
think that it has to do with Barnett’s desire to discomfort
adherents of the Democratic Party. He suggests that the
Republican Party, at least from the time of Lincoln but
substantially going back to the Federalists who hated Jeffersonian
democracy, instantiates a basically libertarian (or, at least, antidemocratic) view of constitutional propriety. Perhaps it is true as
an empirical matter that more Republicans than Democrats over
time have embraced such a vision, though it might take a
considerable effort to demonstrate this when looking at a broad
range of issues that might be subsumed under “devotion to
liberty.” After all, it is contemporary Democrats who are
generally committed to the norm of “reproductive choice,” a topic
notably ignored by Barnett, who prefers to discuss admittedly
outrageous regulation of would-be florists. Barnett made a fair
point in the symposium at which an earlier version of this essay
was originally presented: one’s views on abortion are inevitably
linked to the extent that one views a fetus as a full human being
entitled to the panoply of “natural rights” attached to that status.
So perhaps one can understand his dodging that question in this
book. However, there are obviously other questions linked to
sexuality, sexual freedom, and sexual identity. One’s views on
what has come to be identified as GLBT issues require no decision
as to when one becomes entitled to full recognition as a human
being. It is obvious, though, that contemporary Democrats are far
more likely than their Republican counterparts to adopt what
might be viewed as libertarian positions with regard to the legal
(and social) treatment of GLBTs.
But Barnett is not really offering an argument based on the
actual history or current positions of the American political
parties. His version of the Republican Party—and, therefore, a
constitution ostensibly identified with that Party—requires that
he ruthlessly ignore or dismiss not only a number of contemporary
differences between the two parties with regard to the liberties
they emphasize (or choose to ignore), but also the views of many
officials elected over time under the Republican banner. It is one
thing to deny the appellation “Republican” to the 2016 nominee
of the Republican Party (whose election to the presidency Barnett
opposes) Donald J. Trump, though that scarcely stills any
14. See especially THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), the locus classicus of
this opposition.
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questions one may have about the support Trump is receiving
from, say, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan or Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell or, for that matter, Barnett’s original
choice for the nomination, Rand Paul. But let that pass. It is surely
more problematic to be similarly dismissive of, say, Theodore
Roosevelt or, dare one suggest, Richard Nixon, both major
architects, albeit separated by many decades, of the modern
administrative and highly regulatory state.
Consider, though, two of Barnett’s central historical villains,
Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt. That is surely no
surprise,
given
recent
demonization
by
right-wing
constitutionalists of the Progressive Era. Epstein shares that
animus. Wilson, of course, was a Democrat (with a truly
regrettable deep vein of racism), and Roosevelt famously broke
with the GOP in the 1912 election and thus guaranteed Wilson’s
election over the Republican stalwart William Howard Taft. So
we are invited basically to read TR out of the Republican Party,
as I suspect Barnett might think it is true as well for the 1916 Party
nominee, Charles Evans Hughes. But even Taft presents
problems. Put to one side some of the “progressive” aspects of his
Presidency. More to the point, perhaps, one would literally never
know from reading The Republican Constitution that Taft himself,
like the detested Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissented from the
Court’s 1923 invalidation of a federal minimum wage law in
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.15 “The right of the Legislature
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to limit the hours of
employment on the score of the health of the employee, it seems
to me,” wrote the former President and now Chief Justice, “has
been firmly established.”16
Some readers may be surprised to discover that Herbert
Hoover was also a dangerous progressive. There is certainly a case
to be made for that proposition; Amity Schlaes, in her admiring
biography of Calvin Coolidge and his commitment to
conservative verities,17 certainly has little good to say about that
president’s Secretary of Commerce. There was a reason, after all,
that FDR expressed regret in 1920 that Hoover would not run for
the presidency as a Democrat. And Hoover as president
15. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of the D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (Taft, C.J.,
dissenting).
16. Id. at 563.
17. AMITY SHLAES, COOLIDGE (2013).
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appointed both Hughes to succeed Taft and then the New York
Democrat (and Jew) Benjamin Cardozo to succeed Holmes. One
can certainly argue that he has been unfairly typecast as a simplemindedly reactionary villain jousting against the heroic Franklin
Roosevelt and his New Deal. But then one has to ask why the
Republican Party even during the era of Calvin Coolidge would
be so attracted to a genuine progressive.
When discussing (and praising) Earl Warren for Brown v.
Board of Education, Barnett tendentiously identifies him a
Republican—presumably because he ran for the vice-presidency
in 1948 as Thomas Dewey’s running mate, though he had in fact
received the nominations of both parties when running for reelection as governor of California. Unmentioned is the fact that
as California’s Attorney General, Warren was a zealous supporter
of the ethnic cleansing of Japanese-Americans and their
Japanese-national parents (who by U.S. law were barred from
becoming citizens) and relocation to what Justice Roberts
described as “concentration camps.” Nor does Barnett exhibit
equal pride in other decisions identified with the “Warren Court.”
The Republican President who appointed Warren to the
Court also appointed William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, and
John Marshall Harlan (as well as the ill-fated Charles Whittaker,
who resigned after five years because of the unbearable tensions
attached to the role of Supreme Court justice). But would even
Stewart and Harlan meet Barnett’s criteria of “true
Republicans”? I think not, because they often (but not always)
presented themselves as devotees of “judicial restraint” against
their colleagues’ innovative decisions.
Indeed, as he notes, flesh-and-blood Republican Party
leaders and their nominees to the judiciary usually embraced the
slogan of “judicial restraint.” Of no one was this more true than
Robert Bork, President Reagan’s ill-fated nominee for a position
on the Supreme Court. Yet his teachings are now being subjected
to full-scale revision by persons who, like Barnett, wish to endorse
“judicial engagement” as a substitute for “judicial restraint,” even
if “judicial engagement” is thought to be a far more palatable
slogan than “judicial activism.” Bork was so twentieth century
inasmuch as he endorsed Holmes’s dissent in Lochner denouncing
the majority for invalidating New York’s law limiting the hours
that bakers could work. Holmes famously acknowledged that
some people might view the New York law as “tyrannical,” but it
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did not matter: legislative majorities should be deferred to, and
Bork enthusiastically agreed. He objected only to Holmes’s
leaving some space available for reference to unenumerated
“fundamental principles” as a source of judicial power.
Barnett cannot be pleased with the fact that both William
Rehnquist and, more recently, his successor Chief Justice John
Roberts, went equally out of their way to praise Holmes’s dissent.
The latter happily cited Holmes in his Obergefell dissent by way
of denouncing the majority for deviating from the correct posture
of “judicial restraint” in a society that, as Holmes insisted, consists
of people with “fundamentally different views” about the
(im)propriety of same-sex marriage. Such differences might
include what might count as “natural rights” or even whether
there are any such entities at all. (Holmes certainly had no such
beliefs.)
Again, one can certainly debate the merits of Barnett’s
substantive notions, which are consistently interesting whether
one accepts them or not. I would have no hesitation to
recommend the book to students and other laypeople interested
in a brisk and interesting argument about how one might
understand the Constitution as tilting very much in a libertarian
direction. But his title disserves his own argument inasmuch as it
generates far more heat than light.
Having gotten my unhappiness over his title off my chest, let
me address what is far more important, the actual content of his
arguments and their merits. I will first address his revisionist
understanding of “popular sovereignty,” which is genuinely
interesting and worth arguing about. Rejecting the common
notion that the term refers to the collective “people,” Barnett
instead adopts a radically individualist conception. It is, to be sure,
based on fascinating views developed in perhaps the first great
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Chisholm v.
Georgia,18 but its distinguished provenance does not overcome the
difficulties presented by such an argument.
I will then turn to his insistence that the fall from a prior
constitutional Eden occurs only in the hated Progressive Era.
Instead, I will argue that Barnett’s real enemy must be “the Great
Chief Justice” John Marshall, whose principal contributions to
American constitutionalism are given a quite distorted reading in
18.

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
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order to fit into Barnett’s own argument. Marshall certainly need
not be accepted as the last word on constitutional meaning.
Perhaps McCulloch and Gibbons are ripe for overruling or, at
least, significant modification. But one must ignore quite a bit of
Marshall’s handiwork in order to enlist him into Barnett’s version
of the “Republican constitution.”
Finally, I will offer some observations about Barnett’s
systematic dismissal of what is ordinarily meant as “democracy.”
He does this in two quite different ways. The first is to express
disdain for the actual abilities of Americans to engage in the kind
of “reflection and choice”19 that underpins any truly serious
democratic theory. The second is to promote a strong notion of
“judicial engagement” that would in fact empower the judiciary
to invalidate at least some significant number of statutes or
administrative regulations that under Barnett’s views would be
deemed “arbitrary” or otherwise in violation of the rights
protected by a strong notion of individual sovereignty.
ON SOVEREIGNTY, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND
WELFARE RIGHTS
There is probably no trickier notion in political theory than
that of “sovereignty” in general and “popular sovereignty” in
particular.20 Does, for example, “sovereignty” just mean the
right/ability to rule (without limits) and never to be ruled in turn?
That notion almost certainly derives from concepts surrounding
Divine sovereignty. It is indeed difficult (though not impossible)
to imagine a God who is a “constitutional sovereign,” limited in
power not by other gods in a polytheistic universe, but, rather, by
notions of morality that are God-independent.21 And, of course, if
we credit the ontological notion of a divine sovereign and believe
there are epistemological means of discerning the commands of
that sovereign, then we are presented squarely with the claims of
those who resist obedience to undoubtedly otherwise valid legal

19. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), discussed in SANFORD
LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2015).
20. See Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution:
Tensions in the Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644 (2014).
21. See obviously PLATO, EUTHYPHRO (399-395 BCE), for a classic statement of this
issue.
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commands in the name of their overriding duty to the true
Sovereign of the Universe.22
One can view the development of what political theorists call
“modern” political theory in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries as instantiating the displacement of God as the
sovereign in favor of a state that itself takes on the appurtenances
of sovereignty, whatever exactly that term is thought to mean. For
a while, of course, sovereignty was placed in a monarch who was
thought to be magistrate chosen by God and thus entitled to the
same level of obedience.23 The divine right of kings did not survive
the seventeenth century, let alone the eighteenth century that saw
both the American and French Revolutions and then the
establishment of their respective constitutions. Instead, the notion
of “popular sovereignty” emerged front and center. It is that
notion that elicits Barnett’s interest.
An old maxim, “the voice of the people is the voice of God,”
denounced in a 798 letter from Aucoin to Charlemagne, took on
a much more affirmative valence.24 Some might interpret this as
simply an assertion that God in fact speaks through the voice of
the majority; others, less sectarian, might suggest that we can have
no real idea what God might desire (or even if there is a God) and
that the authority once assigned to God should instead be given
to the “voice of the people.” Quite obviously, in either case we
may have significant difficulties in identifying “the people” who
count as authoritative. Does this refer, for example, only to a
unanimous declaration by the relevant “people” as to some
proposition, with even one dissent making any claim of overriding
authority invalid? Or, on the other hand, do we accept some
notion of majority (or super-majority) rule even at the price of
overriding the good-faith objections of those who dissent?25 We
know beyond shadow of a doubt that those who framed the
Constitution, “ordained” in the name of “We the People,” were
indifferent to the inevitable reality of disagreement, so long as it
didn’t become large enough to capture control of a given
22. See Sanford Levinson, Divided Loyalties: The Problem of “Dual Sovereignty” and
Constitutional Faith, 29 TOURO L. REV. 241 (2013).
23. See, e.g., Romans 13:1 (King James) (“Let every soul be subject unto the higher
powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.”).
24. See, e.g., Vox Populi, Vox Dei, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vox_
Populi,_Vox_Dei (last visited May 10, 2016).
25. See, e.g., MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY: THE ORIGINS AND
LIMITS OF SUPERMAJORITY RULE (2013).
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convention charged with ratifying the Constitution. After all,
there was not a hint of a suggestion that the 30-27 vote in New
York, for example, rendered illegitimate that state’s ratification
of the Constitution. To be sure, neither Rhode Island nor North
Carolina was in the Union when George Washington was
inaugurated on April 30, 1789; that is evidence, though, only for
the proposition that each state did have to assent, as a corporate
entity, before being bound by the new Constitution. But antiFederalist minorities within the states were out of luck.
None of this supports Barnett’s interesting and important
argument, based largely on a debatable reading of the Declaration
of Independence and a more plausible reading of the opinions of
Chief Justice Jay and Justice James Wilson in Chisholm v.
Georgia,26 which unequivocally rejected “state sovereignty” in
behalf of individual sovereignty, where “the people” means what
Barnett repeatedly refers to as “the people as individuals, each
and every one” (p. 68). As to the Declaration, Barnett, like many
Americans, focuses almost exclusively on the notion that each
individual has an equal and inalienable right to “life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness” that, by definition, cannot be abridged
by the state. Indeed, it might even comprise “tyranny” for the
state to do so. This reading is used to support Barnett’s strong
insistence on the ontological existence of “natural rights” (and, of
course, our epistemological abilities to discern exactly what they
are), though he does not seem to ground those rights on a Creator
instead of, say, an Aristotelian capacity to engage in “right
reason.” In any event, Barnett’s version of the Declaration leads
to a radically individualist account that, among other things,
requires a quite radical revision of what the Declaration at its
beginning might mean by reference to “the one people.” It is, after
all, this collective entity who seceded from the British Empire and
who in doing so, it must be added, were decidedly nonunanimous, given the plethora of Loyalists who opposed
secession. There are more than a few overtones in Barnett’s
approach of Margaret Thatcher’s famous statement that “there is
no such thing as society. There are individual men and women,
and there are families.”27 (I will presently turn to the implication
26. Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
27. See Margaret Thatcher, Epitaph for the eighties? “there is no such thing as
society,” THE SUNDAY TIMES (Oct. 31, 1987), http://briandeer.com/social/thatchersociety.htm.
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of the fact that “there are families,” which raises problems for
radical individualism.)
Barnett confusingly suggests that his “modern” opponents
“locate[] popular sovereignty in Congress or state governments,
which supposedly represent the ‘will of the people’” (p. 72). It is
certainly true that the central arguments in behalf of the
legitimacy of institutions of representative government all involve
some notion that they reflect the “will of the people.” This
argument can be found in The Federalist itself and its embrace of
what Publius calls “republican government.” But many
“moderns” support various mechanisms of “direct democracy,”
including initiative and referenda. That itself demonstrates that
merely “representative government” is open to significant
criticism as not being sufficiently reflective of popular “will,”
whether because of inherent limitations attached to the idea of
“representation” or, more ominously, to the specter of corruption
and the capture of representative institutions by factional
interests. This, after all, was the basis of the turn toward direct
democracy in the western American states at the turn of the 20th
century.28 One finds a growing mistrust of institutions of
representative government on the part of both the contemporary
right and left alike. To cite a contemporary phrase, these
institutions are perceived as “rigged” in favor of the rich and
powerful—or, if one wishes, of “progressive” cosmopolitan and
liberal elites who are indifferent to the plight of Joe Sixpack—and
something drastic should be done about this.
But this may be only a relatively minor caveat, for key is
surely Barnett’s emphasis on individual sovereignty. What the
Declaration calls “the consent of the governed” apparently
requires that “all these sovereign individuals” give their consent
(p. 78, emphasis in original). This doesn’t mean that they must
empirically agree, which is obviously impossible as a practical
possibility. Instead, truly legitimate governmental commands
must be those that would receive the consent of all rational
individuals aware of their natural rights. This might be termed as
a form of “ideal contractualism” run riot, though, of course, there
are distinguished antecedents for such views.

28. See, e.g., STEPHEN GRIFFIN, BROKEN
AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2015).

TRUST: DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT
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The problem of tyrannizing even a single holdout is a real
one; it can be said to be the basis of a work that Barnett does not
rely on, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, inasmuch as one must
imagine, in the “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance,”
that one could occupy just any position in the society; therefore,
basic constitutive rules should be designed to assure that even the
person least well off will accept the constitutional order that
places him in an inferior position as having been designed in a
completely “fair” process.
Barnett forces us to ask whether one can take truly seriously
such a radical theory of individual sovereignty. Is it really the
case—or in what sense could it possibly be the case—that “I am
the master of my fate/ I am the captain of my soul”?29 Are we
really never obliged to follow the orders of others who claim rights
of “mastery” or “captaincy,” perhaps by capturing control of lawmaking institutions that compel us to behave in ways that we
would prefer not to or even plausibly believe violate our rights,
natural or otherwise? I do not mean these as “knockdown”
questions. Who among us has not been tempted, at one point or
another, to assert our own individual sovereignty over the rest of
the world, even as modified by the necessity to recognize the
equal claims of others with regard to our common “natural
rights”? But such arguments do seem ultimately to lead to a
basically anarchic view of the world; taken seriously, they serve to
invalidate the legitimacy of every single existing government that
can be shown to violate some set of rights under one or another
extant theory of “natural rights.” Any and all theories of political
obligation become vulnerable, perhaps fatally.30
I should emphasize that this does not in itself invalidate
Barnett’s arguments. Perhaps every single existing government is
illegitimate in some profound sense. To the extent that I take my
own arguments seriously in Our Undemocratic Constitution, it is
entailed that I do not view the present U.S. government organized
under that Constitution as wholly legitimate. But neither Barnett
nor I offer a full explanation of what follows from any such
perception. Does it simply validate reformist politics designed to
overcome the defects that surely exist, or can it justify armed
29. William
Ernest
Henley,
Invictus,
THE
POETRY
FOUNDATION,
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/182194 (last visited May 10, 2016).
30. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
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overthrow of a presumptively illegitimate state? The question
takes on added weight inasmuch as both Barnett and I share a
deep interest in the existence of the Second Amendment within
our Constitution and the extent to which it implicitly speaks to the
potential of armed overthrow of an oppressive government by an
aroused and self-regulated “people.”
But, more than ever, any such views must rely on a welldeveloped theory of how we tell the difference between legitimate
and oppressive governance. What, for example, constitutes
government in the “general welfare,” as against illegitimate rent
seeking by well-placed factions who have captured government
for their nefarious private purposes? One simply does not get
enough of a solid sense of what the “general welfare” means to
Barnett beyond the provision of certain “public goods” that, by
definition, would not be created without coercive taxation
because of the ability of “free riders” to share in the goods without
having to purchase them via a market. But modern government
obviously involves massive redistributions from one set of
taxpayers to others. All of us, whatever our place on the political
spectrum, can no doubt think of examples that we detest, even if
our lists might not overlap. The real question, though, is the extent
to which our lists of permitted “general welfare” expenditures or
“public goods” would in fact overlap.
As is common especially in books written for general
audiences, Barnett is very effective in selecting cases that might
make our collective blood simmer, even if not boil. I have no brief
for ridiculous requirements imposed on would-be floral designers,
and I happily ridicule the purported Oklahoma state interest
asserted in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.31 as a justification for
compelling hapless glasses-wearers to pay rents to optometrists or
opthamologists should they wish to have their glasses duplicated.
I have no hesitation in teaching my students that no plausible
explanation for the actual passage of the legislation can ignore the
likely presence of campaign contributions directed at state
representatives who are participating in a de facto auction market
relative to their votes. No attractive world would come to an end
if courts were more inclined to monitor such patent rent seeking
in circumstances where the assertion of a public purpose is
implausible (even if not outright “lunatic” as presumably required
31.

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

6 - LEVINSON_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

128

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

1/3/17 9:01 AM

[Vol. 32:113

by the most austere version of “minimum rationality”). But, at the
end of the day, imposition of what is sometimes called “minimum
rationality with bite” would not require invalidation of more than
a small fraction of regulatory laws. Is it really the case that Barnett
would be satisfied to stop with the invalidation of ridiculous laws
limiting the liberty interests of would-be florists or opticians
devoted to reducing the prices of duplicate glasses?
Barnett might complain that I am overestimating the degree
to which he is a radical individualist. After all, in discussing “our
duties” even in a system of “natural rights,” he emphasizes the
“duties to our children” (p. 126). To put it mildly, though, there is
no discussion either precisely what these duties are or where
exactly they come from. At the very least, they are obviously
“positive” duties rather than any general duty simply to let the
child “alone” so that he/she can develop without our interference.
Presumably we are called upon to provide food, clothing, shelter,
medical care (unless we are Christian Scientists), and education
(for starters).
A given family can be viewed as a mini-welfare state, with
redistribution flowing from better off parents to decidedly
vulnerable children. The obvious question, at least to
contemporary liberals (if not libertarians) is what happens if, say,
the parents die. Does the state have a duty to provide a variety of
welfare goods to the child—and, if so, for how long? Must the
state make sure that the child receives food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and an adequate level of education? Consider, in
this context, such canonical cases as DeShaney or Rodriguez. The
first, of course, left “Poor Joshua” to his extraordinarily sad fate
unless the state could be sufficiently implicated in it, which,
according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, was not the case. The
second almost insouciantly announced that education, unlike
reproductive choice, did not constitute the kind of “fundamental
right” or “interest” that justified judicial intervention in the name
of the Constitution. A footnote did leave open the possibility,
however, that the case would have come out differently had Texas
offered no education at all. One might believe that Justice Powell
was sincere in writing this footnote given his later vote in Plyler v.
Doe,32 which invalidated the state’s refusal to supply any
education at all to undocumented children (also called, of course,
32.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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“illegal aliens”). Quite obviously, different questions are raised as
children make the transition into full-scale adulthood, but I am
left curious how much Barnett’s notion of individual sovereignty
and natural rights allows for a redistributionist state that takes
from adult haves to transfer to have-not children. These children
may, of course, be orphans, but, more likely, they have parents
who simply cannot afford to purchase through the market the
kinds of goods that are necessary to their flourishing in the society
in which they are growing up.
In the symposium on his book, Barnett suggested that I, like
all too many latter-day political liberals affiliated with the
Democratic Party, want to treat adults as if they were children. To
some extent this is true, though not, I think, in the paternalistic
way that Barnett is suggesting. That is, what is central with regard
to providing many services to children is their essential
vulnerability. A sick child may well realize the need for medical
services, just as a hungry child knows that she needs food. One is
not foisting these goods on a recalcitrant child who loves feeling
sick, hungry, or exposed to the elements. Paternalism arises when
the child would prefer to eat potato chips instead of broccoli, not
in the provision of food itself.
The most fundamental questions of the redistributive welfare
state arise with regard to attributing responsibility for the
sufferings of vulnerable adults. Are adults suffering from the
consequences of a natural disaster or the vagaries of structural
changes in the economy to be treated as “child-like” at least with
regard to being free of fault for their dreadful situations, or is it
fair instead to say that as captains of their fate they are responsible
for the shoals they run into and the possibility of seeking into the
depths? As Michele Dauber Landis demonstrated in The
Sympathetic State, much of the defense of the New Deal welfare
state was predicated on analogizing the unemployment of that
period to other “natural disasters” that had elicited legislative
responses under the rubric of “disaster relief,” all of which
involved redistribution, of money, goods, or services to those
without resources to purchase them contractually in private
markets. All of us are subject to returning to the social reality of
vulnerability most obvious in childhood.33 One need not demean
33. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
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suffering adults when comparing them to children along this
singular dimension of vulnerability and lack of fault for their
predicament. Even if they are, in some sense at fault, as with the
alcohol-abuser who develops liver disease, we are left with
profound questions about whether even they should be left to die
in the street. The modern welfare state denies us the luxury of
dismissing the plight of the vulnerable as their own fault.
Perhaps it is unfair, at least based on the four corners of this
book, to attribute to Barnett a worked-out position with regard to
the constitutional legitimacy of the contemporary welfare state.
He is not willing to condemn taxation as theft, for example, and
he scarcely presents us with a full-scale theory of the meaning of
“general welfare,” preferring instead to concentrate on particular
examples, such as the regulation of florists or opticians, that seem
to be far away from vindicating “general welfare” interests.
However, he does devote his first chapter to railing against the
abominations of Obamacare, and he is probably the primary
architect of the argument that the Affordable Care Act
represented overreaching by Congress inasmuch as it was based
on the Commerce Clause. However, he is strangely silent on
whether Romneycare, the Massachusetts program passed under
the leadership of then-Governor Mitt Romney, a central feature
of which was a similarly coercive mandate to purchase insurance.
There is much in the book expressing a regard for federalism,
but, quite obviously, it is unclear why locally-based limitations on
natural rights is more tolerable than that emanating from
Congress. Certainly James Madison in The Federalist No.10
offered no reason to feel particularly admiring of state-level
governments, which were presented largely as cesspools of
“factions” eager to capture governments for their own selfish
purposes. Far more to the point, perhaps, is the fact that he has
never publicly suggested that a federal tax-financed single-payer
system would violate any constitutional norms even if, as a
practical matter, it would be at least as coercive and redistributive
as the Affordable Care Act and its reliance on private insurance
companies to provide coverage instead of the national
government.
IS THE REAL ENEMY JOHN MARSHALL?
Barnett, like many contemporary conservatives, exhibits
remarkable disdain for Progressives and Progressivism. I am
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surprised, frankly, that he did not choose, when distinguishing his
book from mine, to note, with suitable criticism, the fact that I
bookend the text first with a well-known text by Thomas Jefferson
on the desirability of constitutional change and then, at the end,
and perhaps more importantly, with a long excerpt from
Woodrow Wilson explicitly adopting a Darwinian view of
constitutional evolution. Both of these worthies were certainly
disdainful of the views associated with the late Antonin Scalia,
who proudly rejected any notion of a “living constitution” in favor
of one that has long-since been dead, perhaps even mummified in
1787 or 1791.34 As a committed originalist, Barnett has argued
eloquently in favor of Scalia’s vision, criticizing him only for his
“faint-heartedness” in enforcing it when presented, say, with the
fact that federal drug control laws were decidedly oppressive
when enforced against persons with painful and even terminal
diseases.35
Woodrow Wilson has relatively few defenders these days,
and I will not take it upon myself to embark on such a defense
here (though I certainly do not recant my quotation from him in
Our Undemocratic Constitution). The reason is that the “living
Constitution,” in reality if not necessarily in name, emerges well
before the Progressive Era. It is a part of our basic constitutional
DNA. Originalists, including Barnett, have a significant, perhaps
fatal, problem handling precedent and the inevitable extent to
which precedents, if respected, serve to amend the Constitution
decidedly outside Article V.
To be sure, Barnett protested, at the conference on his book,
that The Republican Constitution is not intended to be an
originalist tract. As Jack Balkin notes in his own contribution,
inasmuch as Barnett emphasizes a single approach—or what my
sometime colleague Philip Bobbitt calls a “modality”—to
constitutional interpretation, it is that of “ethos,” i.e., drawing on
the implicit premises of American political culture to discern basic
constitutional limits. This is surely not surprising inasmuch as
Barnett is identified with the revival of interest in what had been
“the forgotten Ninth Amendment” and its seeming allusion to
unenumerated rights. That still, however, does not account for his
34. See, e.g., Bruce Allen Murphy, Justice Antonin Scalia and the ‘Dead’ Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/15/opinion/justice-antoninscalia-and-the-dead-constitution.html?_r=0.
35. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, (2005).
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argument that the downfall of American constitutionalism
awaited the Progressive Era.
Why should not a chief villain in Barnett’s universe be “the
Great Chief Justice” himself, John Marshall? Although it may be
safer, for a variety of reasons, to attack Progressives, including
Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt, as radical deviants from wellentrenched American constitutional tradition, that is, for better
or worse, incorrect. Just as the snake was a key inhabitant of the
Garden of Eden, so was “living constitutionalism” present near
the creation itself.
Consider what is undoubtedly the greatest of all of Marshall’s
opinions, McCulloch v. Maryland,36 which famously upheld
congressional chartering of a Bank of the United States in spite of
the fact that no explicit authority to issue corporate charters is
included within the list of enumerated powers set out in Article I,
Section 8. Given that I have spent an entire twelve-hour reading
course at the Harvard Law School engaging in a sentence-bysentence exegesis, I will certainly not take the time to write a truly
extensive piece on every aspect of Marshall’s innovations in that
decision. I will, though, look at some of the most important (and
relevant) arguments—or raw assertions—found in Marshall’s
state paper, which might be viewed as a remarkable example of
the “judicial engagement” sought by Barnett.
By 1819, most political elites had seemingly accommodated
themselves to the constitutionality of the Bank of the United
States. After all, James Madison, who had resolutely attacked the
constitutionality of the Bank in a 1791 speech to his colleagues in
the House of Representatives, signed the Bank renewal bill in
1816. Moreover, he had in 1815
…[W]aiv[ed] the question of the constitutional authority of the
Legislature to establish an incorporated bank, as being
precluded, in my judgment, by the repeated recognitions under
varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution, in
acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the
Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes,
of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.37

36.
37.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Quoted in BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 233 (1957). The general story of the renewal is told at
227-233.
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At the very least, he never formally recanted his earlier
speech and said, for example, that he was wrong (and Hamilton
was in fact correct). What makes most sense is that Madison
conceded that we had a “living Constitution” avant le lettre that is
amenable to change, whatever the “original meaning,” however
defined might be, because of a mixture of practice and the sheer
recognition of the value of the policy at issue. So if one views
Madison, altogether dubiously, as a privileged “father of the
Constitution,” it is clear that he was willing to watch his child
develop in ways that he might not have predicted and earlier
actively disapproved of.
But then we turn to McCulloch itself. Upholding the
constitutionality of the Bank in fact posed no difficulty. Three
paths were available. One would have had the Court itself, after
engaging in what we would today call “strict scrutiny,” hold that
the Bank was really-and-truly “necessary” under a quite rigorous
definition of the term. A second would have looked carefully at
the process by which the Bank was approved by Congress and
determined that they applied the correct standard of “necessity”
and that the Court would defer to the obviously rigorous process
even if perchance the justices were not themselves convinced of
the Bank’s true “necessity.” Quite obviously, neither of these
comes remotely close to describing the reality of Marshall’s
decision. Instead, the Court both adopted a decidedly unrigorous
definition of “necessary” (and “proper” as well) and gave almost
absolute deference to Congress’s judgment that the Bank was
“useful” or “convenient.” All of this eventuated, of course, in one
of the most famous, and influential, paragraphs in the entire
canon of American constitutional law:
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government
are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But
we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow
to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the
means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high
duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
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consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.38

Barnett may draw some consolation from the first sentence
about “limited” government. Marshall did write it, and there is at
least one recent article by Professor David Schwartz that insists
that the conventional reading of McCulloch exaggerates the
deference that Marshall gave to Congress.39 But, surely, as
Schwartz himself recognizes, this is not in fact the message that
has been drawn from the case over its now almost-200-year
history. It is not that one cannot read McCulloch more
restrictively. As someone who has throughout his career
emphasized the indeterminacy of what I have labeled “The
Constitution of Conversation,”40 I would hesitate to assert that
McCulloch is capable of one and only one possible reading. Thus,
one should read Professor Schwartz’s long and valiant attempt to
overturn the conventional wisdom. Yet, I remain quite confident
that it is idiosyncratic in the extreme to read McCulloch as a case
whose central meaning is in fact the limitations on the powers of
the national government.
But wait, there is more than simply the canonical paragraph
quoted above. There is also the famous sentence, described by
Justice Frankfurter as the single most important sentence in all
the constitutional corpus: “we must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding.”41 I have explained elsewhere my
perplexity at Frankfurter’s comment, since, after all, the sentence
is a tautology at a formal level. But then, at long last, I combined
the reminder at the conclusion of paragraph sixteen with the
statements in paragraph twenty-seven:
This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which
government should, in all future time, execute its powers,
would have been to change, entirely, the character of the
instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would
have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules,

38. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
39. See David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1 (2015).
40. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012).
41. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
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for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. 42

That is, the Constitution is designed, in outline form, to
provide the basis for a nation through vast reaches of time,
including, for what it is worth, the expansion of the original
Atlantic-coast nation to the shores of the Pacific and even beyond.
It will, inevitably and properly, require adaptation when, as will
inevitably be the case, “crises” (italics in original) and
“exigencies” require that government act, even in what might be
unprecedented ways. One can be confident, for what it is worth,
that Marshall’s notion of “crisis” was as latitudinarian as his
notion of “necessity.” If, for example, a future generation
believed that the roughly one-seventh of the U.S. economy
devoted to our medical services industry presented a genuine
problem to American society, Congress could legitimately
respond to this “exigency” by requiring that Americans be
prohibited from their preferred posture of free-riding in favor of
the required purchase of insurance policy from private insurers.
Is this the “best” means to a worthwhile end? No. I would have
preferred some single-payer system financed entirely through
taxes, which Barnett appears to concede would be completely
unproblematic as a “tax and spend” measure. But Obamacare is
surely no worse than Romneycare, unless one distinguishes it only
on the formal basis that the latter manifests the state’s “police
power,” however coercive it may be, while the former is not
allowed as an act of Congress.
At least with regard to something like Romneycare (though
not regulation of opticians or florists), Barnett seems to rely less
on engaged judiciaries and more on what Ilya Somin calls “foot
voting,” i.e., the ability of someone who does not like a given
state’s regulation because of a (justified?) belief that it violates
natural rights to pick up and leave (p. 175). He contrasts the
ability to move from Massachusetts, say, to Texas with the
presumably far greater burden of moving from Massachusetts to
Canada; one should not be forced to leave the country for another
one with a better mix of policies. But why? Business corporations
relocate all the time, seeking the most favorable tax treatment for
their profits. Why should we not expect similar flexibility from
individuals?
42.

Id. at 415.
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The answer, if there is one, presumably involves the
exorbitant personal costs of tearing up one’s roots and
transferring one’s loyalties from our common country and
emigrating abroad. But are there no such similar costs to moving
from Massachusetts to Texas or, perhaps, even to New Hampshire
or Maine? To put it mildly, being told that one can engage in
“foot-voting,” even if it does serve as a certain kind of safety
valve, seems almost pathetic as a true response to someone who
has roots in a given state and would find moving out of it almost
as costly as moving to a truly foreign country.
Actually, to his credit, Barnett recognizes that “the policies
of state government” can often be described, in Clint Bolick’s
vivid term, as “grassroots tyranny.”43 We must take essentially on
faith that this capacity for tyranny will be adequately limited by
the fact that states can compete with one another and that
relatively random individuals can engage in their right to “footvote” by declaring they are mad as hell and will not take it
anymore as they move to a more compatible state.
The second great “consolidationist” decision of Marshall, of
course, is Gibbons v. Ogden,44 which became the basis for much
of the New Deal expansion of congressional power so disdained
by Barnett. Perhaps imitating Marshall, himself a master of
selective quotation, Barnett cites only the passages from Gibbons
that support Barnett’s argument (p. 173). It is true that Marshall
wrote that “no direct general power over [a variety of objects] is
granted to Congress; and consequently, they remain subject to
State legislation.” Just as with his assurances in McCulloch about
the national government being one of “limited powers,” one can
doubt the degree to which Marshall truly agreed with critics of
what persons like Patrick Henry and Brutus termed as
“consolidated” government.45 What is missing in Barnett’s
account is the (in)famous paragraph that has been widely
43. Id. at 180.
44. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
45. It is interesting that Greg Abbott, the governor of Texas who supports a new
constitutional convention to propose a number of amendments gathered together under
the rubric of “The Texas Plan,” and who draws quite explicitly on Barnett’s advocacy of
“the Repeal Amendment” that would allow de facto nullification of federal laws, avidly
quotes Brutus and other anti-Federalist critics of the Constitution. The problem, of course,
is that, as with many dissenters, their altogether cogent critiques simply reinforce the view
that the Constitution, correctly interpreted, did indeed work to centralize power far more
than they (and Barnett) would prefer.
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interpreted as Marshall giving away the store with regard to the
congressional power and, just as importantly, the irrelevance of
“engaged courts” to serve as monitors over any overreaching that
might occur:
The subject, . . . is . . . commerce, “among the several states.”
The word “among” means intermingled with. A thing which is
among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among
the states, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each
state, but may be introduced into the interior. It is not intended
to say, that these words comprehend that commerce, which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man
in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and
which does not extend to or affect other states. Such a power
would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than
one. . . . The genius and character of the whole government
seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external
concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which
affect the states generally; but not to those which are
completely within a particular state, which do not affect other
states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government. The completely internal commerce of a state,
then may be considered as reserved for the state itself
(emphasis added).46
. . . . This power, like all others vested in congress, is complete
in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty
of congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to
those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, is vested in congress as absolutely
as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution
the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found
in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the
discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in
this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring
war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them
from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must

46.

Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194–95.

6 - LEVINSON_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

138

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

1/3/17 9:01 AM

[Vol. 32:113

often rely solely, in all representative governments…. (emphasis
added).47

I certainly do not present Marshall as the last word on
constitutional interpretation. One is surely free to denounce him
as an unfaithful agent and, indeed, betrayer of his oath of fidelity
to the Constitution. But, obviously, it is harder, in terms of making
a credible argument within America’s constitutional culture, to
denounce “the Great Chief Justice” in the same terms directed by
the late Antonin Scalia at his adversaries. Better to construct a
fictitious history of unbroken constitutional fidelity—save for the
rampages first of Justice Story in Prigg48 and then Chief Justice
Taney in Dred Scot49—than to recognize the responsibility of
Marshall himself for the constitutional vision, whatever we wish
to call it, that Marshall instantiated.
BARNETT’S DISDAIN FOR DEMOCRACY ITSELF
It is not surprising, nor necessarily a cause for criticism, that
Barnett is explicitly anti-democratic. After all, “taking rights
seriously,” which is Barnett’s theme every bit as much as it was
Ronald Dworkin’s, whatever some obvious differences in their
respective positions, entails feeling entitled to disregard
presumptively majoritarian preferences in favor of honoring the
rights that are possessed by individual members (or, on occasion,
groups) of the constitutional order. The more one insists on
“limited government,” the more, by definition, one is disinclined
to honor the choices made by government, even if based on
popular (but not unanimous) consent. That would be true, of
course, even if one were inclined to view public officials as
honorable Publian persons who always kept front and center their
commitment to the public good and not, for example, panderers
to the demands of rent-seeking politically powerful interest
groups. As Dworkin insisted, even public-serving policy goals
took second place to individual rights or, as Barnett would
emphasize, the limitations on government. Presumably he would
applaud what was literally the final act of James Madison as
President, the veto of a public improvements act that obviously

47.
48.
49.

Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196–97.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded (1868).
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gained the approval of both houses of Congress.50 “I am not
unaware,” Madison wrote, “of the great importance of roads and
canals and the improved navigation of water courses, and that a
power in the National Legislature to provide for them might be
exercised with signal advantage to the general prosperity.”51 So
what’s the problem? “[S]uch a power is not expressly given by the
Constitution, and believing that it cannot be deduced from any
part of it without an inadmissible latitude of construction,” he felt
under a duty to veto the legislation.52 Obviously, Marshall had not
yet published his opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, but one
doubts that Madison would necessarily have changed his mind.
After all, he wrote a denunciatory letter to Virginia Chief Justice
Spencer Roane suggesting that Marshall’s opinion, had it been
available in 1788, would have led to the rejection of the
Constitution by delegates to the ratifying convention.53 Taking
rights and limitations seriously just means that commitments to
“establishing justice” or achieving the “general welfare” will be
subordinated to the “blessings of liberty,” whatever the wishes of
a benighted public might be.
But Barnett appears to believe that it is foolish to assume that
legislators will necessarily be wise with regard to their judgments
about justice or welfare, in part because in no serious sense will
their feet be held to the fire by electorates themselves competent
to make such general judgments. Barnett cites Ilya Somin54 as
“explain[ing]” that “[b]ecause one’s vote in an election is
swamped by the ballots of millions of others, it is simply irrational
for most persons to invest too heavily in the time and resources to
learn what it takes to vote wisely”55 The typical voter, therefore,
is decidedly ignorant, even if we concede that with regard to
matters where their choices do matter, they might be quite
intelligent (and well-informed). Moreover, with rare exceptions—
and none at the national level—we can vote only for ostensible

50. See 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584–585 (James Richardson
ed., 1897), http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/metabook?id=mppresidents.
51. James Madison, Veto of federal public works bill (March 3, 1817),
http://constitution.org/jm/18170303_veto.txt.
52. Id.
53. Letter No. CCCXXXI from James Madison to Judge Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 435 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
54. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013).
55. BARNETT, supra note 11, at 176.
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“representatives” and not on specific policies themselves. We
necessarily must choose, when voting for a particular
“representative,” a “complex package of economic and social
policies that voters are not allowed to disaggregate. You must
vote for one of the packages, or not vote at all.”56 What this leads
to is the quite thundering declaration that “a system of voting does
not allow the sovereign people to ‘rule,’ and it is a pernicious myth
to claim that they do.”57 It is, therefore, a happy accident if
Congress (or perhaps any other legislative assembly) actually gets
it right with regard to serving the general welfare. Such views
hardly lead one to view the national government—or perhaps any
significantly large government—as truly legitimate or even likely
to make normatively desirable decisions.
Perhaps this helps to explain Barnett’s seeming opposition to
the Seventeenth Amendment, adopted in 1913 to transfer
selection of senators from state legislatures to the general
electorate.58 Interestingly enough, like Texas Governor Greg
Abbott in his recent proclamation of a Texas Plan of proposed
amendments to the Constitution, Barnett does not call for the
repeal of the Amendment, perhaps because it is almost
unthinkable that an empowered electorate would in fact
acquiesce to its neutering. Instead, he endorses a de-facto
nullification procedure that would lodge the power in “a majority
of state legislatures representing a majority of the population to
repeal any federal law or regulation.”59 I presume that he rejects
Steve Griffin’s call for a procedure for national referenda because
that would lodge entirely too much power in the decidedly
unreliable collective “people” themselves.
As a matter of fact, there is genuine force to Somin’s and
Barnett’s critiques, even if one finds them, Somin’s especially, to
be a bit exaggerated. Both Barnett and I, in contributions to a
symposium at Yale on Bruce Ackerman’s work, independently
cited a powerful statement by the late Yale Professor of History
Edmund Morgan, from his book We the People. “Government,”
wrote Morgan, “requires make believe.” The “fiction” of popular
sovereignty is precisely the assertion that “the few” can
legitimately “govern the many” because of their ostensible
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 177.
Id.
See id. at 247–48.
Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
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accountability to the many through mechanisms of election and
the like.60 To the extent that one adopts the description of this as
a “fiction,” perhaps akin to a Platonic “royal lie,” useful only to
loll the masses into unmerited acceptance of a status quo, then the
foundations of a system ostensibly predicated on rule by “We the
People” seem quite fragile.
In any event, one reason that Barnett rejects a “democratic
Constitution”—or critiques based on the premise that the present
Constitution is insufficiently democratic—is that he has no real
regard for the very idea of democracy, defined as the only
somewhat constrained ability of “the people” to control their own
collective futures, whatever his genuine regard for individuals
who feel beset upon by the demands of the modern regulatory
state. I wish that one could simply dismiss his concerns about
democracy as baseless. Who, however, not only looking at the
general history of the 20th century, but also at the current
spectacle in the autumn of 2016 of what passes for political
campaigning in the United States, can deny the force of the
critique of democracy in the name of other values?61
CONCLUSION
One must recognize, however ruefully, that Barnett sets out
a powerful bill of particulars, even if one is disinclined, either on
ontological or epistemological grounds, to join his embrace of
“natural rights.” Nor does it help that his particular brand of
“classical liberalism” seems to leave little room for a flourishing
notion of communal self-governance and a commitment to the
importance of such elements of social justice and general welfare
as require the aid of a coercive government that requires the
transfer of resources from haves to have-nots.
Barnett’s book will undoubtedly spark many arguments of
the type set out in this symposium. But perhaps the real test of its

60. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13–14 (1988).
61. This review was obviously written before the astounding (and catastrophic)
election of Donald Trump as president. It is hard to deny that the campaign in general,
and then the result, might legitimately test one’s faith in the democratic
experiment. Should in fact one reject the foundational belief in the capacity of Americans
to manifest an acceptable degree of “reflection and choice” about how to manage our
necessarily intertwined lives, we must basically return to Ground Zero with regard to
imagining a constitution adequate to such a reality.
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thesis will be less its impact on the academic community, who may
not be the truly target audience, and more the degree to which it
is embraced by self-identified members of the modern Republican
Party. If, on the other hand, it is most enthusiastically received by
adherents of the Libertarian Party, then it will be harder than ever
to identify Barnett’s Constitution, whether or not one finds it
attractive, with “the Republican Constitution.”

